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The Constitution and the Moral Order
By WILLIAM J. BENNETT*
In a well-known passage Learned Hand has described the place of
law and the Constitution in the maintenance of civility:
You may ask what then will become of the fundamental principles
of equity and fair play which our constitution enshrines and
whether I seriously believe that unsupported they will serve merely
as counsels of moderation. I do not think that anyone can say
what will be left of those principles; I do not know whether they
will serve only as counsels; but this I think I do know-that a so-
ciety so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can
save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save;
that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon
the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will
perish.'
This penetrating formulation of the relationship between pervasive
societal values and enshrined constitutional principles has evoked an
equally probing response from Professor Freund. Freund contends that
Judge Hand's portrait of the role of courts tends to suggest "a people
lost beyond redemption or healthy beyond the need of saving," while
"our situation falls between."2 He notes that "[t]he restraints that the
Constitution forbids are, essentially, only those of public, not private,
action."3 Freund is aware, of course, that maintenance of a spirit of
moderation and other values requisite to a civil, healthy nation-sensi-
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1. L. HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in
THE SPiRrr OF LmERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 181 (I. Dillard ed.
1952) (address by Learned Hand at the 250th anniversary of the founding of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Nov. 21, 1942).
2. P. FEUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 88-89 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as FREUND].
3. Id. at 88.
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ble as well as sensitive-demands more than a constitution. Neverthe-
less, he emphasizes that constitutional law has a role:
The question is not whether the courts can do everything but
whether they can do something. Moreover, the cleavage between
growth from within and alteration imposed from without is not
absolute. Education and the practice of self-improvement may be
fostered by judicious judicial intervention. 4
Freund offers as examples of such judicious intervention the voiding of
restrictive racial covenants and segregation in the public schools-
decisions that he says "break down barriers."5 The removal of such
barriers touches and informs even so-called private belief and action: a
change of environment can alter attitude and behavior.e Nor should the
educational function of the courts be overlooked; Freund reminds us of
Professor Meiklejohn's image of the Supreme Court as a teacher in-
structing us about our best, our national, purposes.7 Finally, the courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, serve an important symbolic function.
The courts stand for the values they announce, articulate, and defend
in their decisions, even, as Professor Bickel has shown, when they de-
cide not to decide.8
Few of us in these times need to be reminded of the importance
that attaches to the interpretation of the Constitution by the judiciary
and the legislature. Law school classes devote careful attention to this;
legal journals attempt regular explication of its significance. That they
do so is appropriate. The very pervasiveness of this focus, however,
suggests that Learned Hand's perspective-that the values expressed in
4. Id. at 89.
5. Id.
6. I had an experience in the South that illustrates Professor Freund's point
regarding the way the removal of barriers by the judiciary fosters changes in attitude and
behavior. While visiting a junior high school classroom in Florence, South Carolina, in
March, 1974, I was shocked to see all the white children sitting on one side of the room,
with all the black students seated on the other. When the children saw my shock and
their teacher said, "What is this zebra-skin classroom?" the students laughed and
returned to their original seats, undifferentiated by race. The students were playing a
joke on the "visiting Yankee," but their freedom to laugh about this situation was
certainly made possible in part by the change in law that had joined them together.
Friends of mine throughout the South report similar experiences- however, I have neither
had nor heard of such experiences in Boston in recent years.
7. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECIH 32 (1948), quoted in FRuND, supra note 2, at
25; accord, Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Rostowi. "The Supreme Court is, among other things,
an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar."
Id. at 208.
8. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term: Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 H~Av. L. REv. 40, 50 (1961).
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the Constitution must live elsewhere before and while they live as law
-merits renewed emphasis in this era. Beyond the contribution of
courts and legislatures, basic values such as equity and fair play require
a generative source. The need remains for what Freund himself has
characterized as a regeneration that must come from within,9 a contin-
ual regeneration that is expressed in the lives of citizens.
It is important to specify some of the basic values that are crucial to
national self-definition and self-sustenance. There is no claim that the
list that follows is exhaustive, that the values noted are of equal signifi-
cance, or that all these values must thrive at all times. These are values,
however, to which a free and healthy society is attentive, values that
such a society ignores at its peril:
1) respect for persons, expressed in part by fair dealings among,
with, and by citizens;1"
2) regard for justice, revealed in part by a commitment to treat-
ig like cases alike, with attention to relevant differences; 1
3) the existence of relatively free and protected association,
movement, thought, speech, and worship;' 2
4) a regard for personal and institutional excellence; 3
5) broad access to the levers of social change;' 4
6) a concern for the domestication of power by responsibility in
government, business, education, and even in private relationships; 5
9. FREUND, supra note 2, at 88.
10. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALTY OF CONSENT 53-54 (1975).
11. See generally THE PoLIrCs OF ARISTOTLE 288 (E. Barker trans. 1946)
[hereinafter cited as ARisTOTLE].
12. See Hand, The Future of Wisdom in America, THE SATuRDAY REVIEw, Nov.
22, 1952, at 9. 'The mutual confidence on which all else depends can be maintained
only by an open mind and a brave reliance upon free discussion. I do not say that these
will suffice; who knows but we may be on a slope which leads down to aboriginal
savagery. But of this I am sure: if we are to escape, we must not yield a foot upon
demanding a fair field, and an honest race, to all ideas." Id. at 55.
13. See Kristol, Republican Virtue vs. Servile Institutions, THE ALTERNATvE: AN
AMERuCAN SPECTATOR, Feb. 1975, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Kristol]. "People do not
respect institutions which are servile; people only respect a society which makes demands
on them, which insists that they become better than they are. Without such a moral
conception of oneself, without a vivid idea as to the kind of person a citizen is supposed
to become, there can be no self-government. And without self-government the people
perish." Id. at 9.
14. See Hurst, Thoreau, Conscience and Law, 19 S.D.L. Rv. 1, 25-30 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Hurst].
15. The necessity for the juxtaposition of power and responsibility is, of course,
eloquently expressed in The Federalist No. 51 by James Madison.
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7) a measure of magnanimity in the people for the support of
worthy activities and projects; 6
8) substantial support for a sound educational system that at-
tends to the development of citizens;17
9) a spirit of tolerance coupled with a judgmental capacity that
enables thoughtful criticism of what is tolerated; 8
10) a concern by persons for their status as moral agents, that is,
for their own virtue and dignity;' 9 and finally,
11) pervasive attention to fostering the conditions that bring
these values into being. 20  Values such as these must surround, pene-
trate, and underlie the laws if our constitutional order is to be a moral
order as well.
I. The Significance of a Moral Order
The belief that the well-being of a social order transcends the
requirements of good laws and good judges is, of course, a Greek
notion. This approach seeks a subtle measure of a society's health, an
assessment based on the character of its people and the kind of spirit
that moves them in their daily lives. What is sought is eunomia:
literally, the "wellness" of the legal construct.2'
16. See E. BURKE, Speech for Conciliation with the American Colonies, in BURKE
ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70 (E. Barkan ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BURKE].
"Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little
minds go ill together." Id. at 120.
17. See T. JEFFERSON, Preamble to a Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1048 (S. Padover ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited
as PADOvER] ("The most effectual means of preventing [tyranny] would be to illumi-
nate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large." Id.); Address by Julian
Huxley at the opening of Johns Hopkins University in 1967, quoted in F. FRANKFURTER,
THE PUBLIC AND rrs GOVERNMENT 164, 166-67 (1930) ("[T]he one condition of success,
your sole safeguard, is the moral worth and intellectual clearness of the individual citi-
zen. Education cannot give these, but it may cherish them and bring them to the
front ...... Id. at 166-67). See generally J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
(1916).
18. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
"But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."
19. See Kristol, supra note 13. See generally PLATO, Crito, THE COLLECTED
DIALoGUES OF PLATO 27 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
PLATO]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 11, at 280-82.
20. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 11, at 311-14.
21. Webster defines "eunomy" as "[clivil order under good laws." WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 881 (2d ed. 1941) (emphasis added). In classical
[Vol. 3
Eunomia is not achieved simply when the laws are wise or well
considered. Rather, it is a condition that depends on a regard
throughout the society for the values the laws express and out of which
they emerge. In the eunomic society the aggregate "lives" of the
citizens supply the crucial evidence, for it is there that the values upon
which the laws depend either thrive or perish. When a nation instead
seeks self-definition or sustenance from "forms," turning to the laws
alone for vindication of its well-being, the health of the society is in
jeopardy. Then an inquiry into the causes of spiritual vitality or mor-
bidity is motivated by the clearest exigency, by fear for that society's
survival.
It is a commonplace that societies have been ravaged as often by
decay from within as by invasion from without.2 In such a situation,
law and constitution may not stand for important, fundamental values,
but instead may stand alone. Then the law's symbolic function is lost,
and there may be the appearance but certainly not the reality of
eunomia. Theodore White invokes the classic example in his portrait of
Cicero's Rome:
His fellow citizens could no longer agree on what they meant
by "justice," or "partnership for common good"; nor could the
Greek mythology, Eunomia is a daughter of Zeus who watches over the affairs of men
with an eye to "good order." HARPER'S DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE AND
ANTIQUITIES 843 (H. Peck ed. 1896).
The philosophical concept being considered here is associated with Solon and
Xenophanes. For Solon, eunomia has to do with good order in the cosmos, which
depends on the proper involvement of each individual in the life of the community. He
emphasizes that "the violation of justice means the disruption" of that "life of the
community," and praises the goddess Eunomia, who manifests her power "in peace and
harmony of the whole social cosmos." 1 W. JAEGER, PAIDEA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK
CULTURE 139-41 (G. Highet trans. 1939). In Jaeger's words, Solon's view of the world
represents a significant movement in Greek thought away from a universe in which the
gods constantly interfere in human affairs toward a conception "that every community
is bound by immanent laws," and "every man is a responsible moral agent with a duty to
be done." Id. at 141. Similarly, the philosopher and poet Xenophanes attempted to
overcome the Homeric view of a universe governed by the gods and to substitute a new
ideal of humanity and human action. As Jaeger says, "It was the power of this new
truth to revolutionize the life and faith of mankind which made it the fitting basis for a
new culture." Thus, the "pattern of eunomia in human society" became "the metaphysi-
cal foundation of city-state morality." Id. at 170.
22. Among the nicer expressions of the commonplace are those of Jean Giraudoux
and John Milton. "Countries are like fruit-the worms are always inside." J.
GmAuioux, SIEGFRIED 14 (P. La Farge & P. Judd trans. 1928). "But what more oft in
Nations grown corrupt, / And by Their vices brought to servitude, / Than to love
Bondage more than Liberty, / Bondage with. ease than strenuous liberty . . . ." J.
MILTON, Samson Agonistes, in THm PoETIcAL WoRKs OF JOHN MILTON 281 (H. Darbi-
shire ed. 1955).
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handful of politicians who soon brought about a revolution. First
they killed Caesar, the man whom Cicero thought to be the greatest
enemy of justice and the common good. And when they beheaded
Cicero a year after, it was for the same reason. Vindictiveness,
passion, killing, ruled Rome; the people stood apart from assassina-
tion and execution alike because they no longer knew what to be-
lieve, and recognized that their leaders believed nothing. By then,
the Republic was dead, for the myths of law that had bound the
Romans in the beginning had been stripped of meaning, reduced
to decorative phrases carved on the marble walls of the Empire,
and the palaces of the tyrants who followed. 23
But long before a people become ruled by vindictiveness, passion,
and killing, they may deny themselves citizenship in fact by their
unconcern for basic values. The absence of vital beliefs about right and
wrong, which precludes consensus on what is meant by "justice," will be
sufficient to destroy eunomia. The relevance to the United States is
clear. Currently, our commitment to responsible self-government is
contradicted by a preoccupation with self-gratification among much of
the populace24 and by a willingness to relegate the task of defining jus-
tice to "law" and "constitutionality."2 5 Such preoccupation and relega-
tion are dangerous because no eunomic constitutional order can survive
the neglect of its citizens. And, ironically, unreasonable reliance on
constitutional form undermines the significant role the Constitution does
have in the maintenance of a moral order. 6
H. The Meaning and Nature of the Constitution:
The Framers
Any thoughtful examination of generally accepted definitions of
"constitution" will reveal that a constitution must depend upon external
values for its efficacy. Charles Howard McIlwain's classic study27
distinguishes the two dominant definitions of constitution; for our pur-
23. T. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH 340 (1975)..
24. See J. SILBER, THm TREMBLE FACTOR 1 (1974). "Our children have not been
corrupted by the teachings of the Old and New Testaments, but they have learned by
heart the TV gospel: Enjoy yourself. . . . They know that it would be un-American to
have anything less than too much. Enjoy yourself immediately, and continue enjoying
yourself. That is the gospel. Television gives no indication of the social or personal
price of enjoyment as a way of life-the program it so enthusiastically peddles. It simply
reiterates the injunction: Engage in self-gratification." Id. at 13. See also Kristol,
supra note 13. "We may think that the Sears, Roebuck catalogue is a splendid
testimonial to American civilization. Most of the Founding Fathers would have found it
a worrisome document." Id. at 5.
25. See text accompanying notes 94-109 infra.
26. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
27. C. McILwAiN, CoNsTrnTbONAusm: ANCIENT AND MODERN (rev. ed. 1947).
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poses, however, their similarities are more significant and telling than
their differences.
The modern definition of a constitution is a deliberate formulation
by a people of its fundamental law; a constitution emerges at the time a
people create a government." Thomas Paine is a major spokesman for
this view,29 which contrasts with the more traditional position associated
with Lord Bolingbroke.3" This latter position is that a constitution is
"the substantive principles to be deduced from a nation's actual institu-
tions and their development."' Thus, the "essential principles to
which Burke and Camden and Otis appealed were no less constitutional
because they were 'unwritten.' "32 The United States and French consti-
tutions are generally cited as the best examples of the first position 33
while the unwritten constitution of Great Britain is offered to illustrate
the second.3 4  The two views are not mutually exclusive. A constitu-
tion can have elements of each, as does the United States Constitution, 5
which is a fundamental document subject to periodic amendment and
interpretation. But either perspective requires a sense of what the
"fundamental law" is and an appreciation of the values upon which the
constitution rests, in the first case for the constitutive act to be meaning-
ful, in the second for the inheritance to vest. 6 If these principles do not
abide in the lives of the citizens, a constitution may be mere words on
paper, a relic rather than a heritage. There are extreme examples: the
Soviet Constitution of 1936, to which Mr. Solzhenitsyn frequently gives
the lie,37 and the Constitution of India in 197538 are both only decorative
28. Id. at 2-3.
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 15.
33. See id. at 2, 14.
34. See id. at 14-15.
35. See id. at 15. See generally E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSnTTIONAL LAW (1929) [hereinafter cited as CoRwIN].
36. As Clinton Rossiter has noted, "the most compelling explanation" for the high
regard in which Americans hold their constitution lies in their "deep-seated conviction
that the Constitution is an expression of the Higher Law, that it is in fact imperfect
man's most perfect rendering of what Blackstone saluted as 'the eternal immutable laws
of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and
which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the
conduct of human actions."' Rossiter, Prefatory Note to CORWIN, supra note 35, at vi.
37. The Soviet Constitution contains a catalogue of guaranteed individual liberties
similar to our own Bill of Rights, including, inter alia, freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, freedom of assembly and meetings, freedom to demonstrate, inviolability of the
person, and inviolability of citizens' dwellings and secrecy of correspondence.
CoNs'rrmnoN OF Tim UNION OF SoviEr SOCIALIST REPuBLICS arts. 125, 127-28 (1936).
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phrases. Less severe cases, where the laws function but the values upon
which they depend are corroding, are harder to detect. Great Britain is
one example; the United States may be becoming another.
The Constitution of the United States can no more forge among
citizens the moral relations upon which rest its principles of equity and
fair play than it can create "contentment in every face, plenty on every
board" 39  The clever definition of constitutionalism as "the name
given to the trust which men repose in the power of words en-
grossed on parchment to keep a government in order"40 merely
highlights what it omits, serving by its deceptive attractiveness to in-
struct. Stronger, more personal bonds than an inattentive "trust" are
required to hold men to their duties, ties that Burke described as
"though as light as air, are as strong as links of iron.' These bonds
are forged by persons in their actions. The framers of our Constitution,
a mix of thinkers with affinities to both Paine and Bolingbroke,42
recognized the importance of such bonds and the centrality of the ethics
Mr. Solzhenitsyn (among others) has often pointed out that such rights do not in fact
exist in his country, perhaps most eloquently in the following portion of The Gulag
Archipelago, 1918-56:
"Our Law is powerful, slippery, and unlike anything else on earth known as 'the
law.'
"We have called this chapter 'The Law Today.' But really it should be called:
'There Is No Law.'
"The same perfidious secrecy, the same fog of unrighteousness hangs in the air
around us, hangs over our cities more densely than the city smoke itself.
"A powerful State towers over its second half-century, embraced in hoops of steel.
The hoops are there indeed but not the law." N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1974, at 12, col. 4
(emphasis added).
38. The preamble to the Indian constitution solemnly promises to "secure to all its
citizens: JUsTICE, social, economic and political; LBERTY of thought, expression, belief,
faith, and worship; EQuALITY of status and of opportunity. .. ." Preamble to Constitu-
tion of the Republic of India, in N. PALMER, THE INDIAN POLTCAL SYSTEM 92 (1961).
As is now well known, India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, after being found guilty of
violating Indian election laws (the penalty for which required her resignation from
Parliament), instituted a series of repressive measures including the jailing of over 600
individuals considered politically dangerous by Mrs. Gandhi and the imposition of strict
censorship on the Indian and foreign press. See U.S. NBws & WoRLD REPoRT, July 7,
1975, at 23. The latter measure was used, among other purposes, to prevent any
extended or explanatory reporting by the Indian media of the prime minister's ultimately
successful effort to clear herself of any legal difficulties by ex post facto exculpatory
legislation. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1975, at 2, col. 4.
39. CoRwiN, supra note 35, at 150.
40. The phrase is Walton H. Hamilton's. D. BOomsTIN, THE AmICANS: THE
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 416 (1965).
41. BURKE, supra note 16, at 19.
42. See generally CORWiN, supra note 35, at 149, 398-400, 408-09.
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of persons. The framers certainly did not believe they were creating the
rights and liberties of citizens, nor that the existence of the Constitution
would itself be sufficient to maintain them. They believed they were
constituting something,43 but this constituting involved neither "mak-
ing" values nor removing the citizens' responsibility to preserve those
values. Rather, they sought to give form and structure to a new
government, to draft a new blueprint for governance. The Constitution
was certainly intended to have moral force, but that force was to be
drawn from fundamental sources, which the framers perceived in the
moral environment of the -new nation rather than in the document itself.
In its broadest strokes the Constitution was intended to remind Ameri-
cans of what they already knew.
The predominance of this view of the Constitution is revealed in
the debate in the 1787 convention over the need for an extended bill of
rights. In part, opposition to a bill of rights rested on the belief thatthe
protection of individual liberties was a matter that properly belonged to
the states; 44 seven of the original states had their own bills by 1784.
45
What is more interesting, however, is that significant opposition was
rooted in philosophical as well as jurisdictional objections. A large
number of delegates did not believe that the rights of citizens had to be
written down to be effective, and -there was substantial sentiment that
articulation of such basic rights was unnecessary at this late stage of the
development of human society. In Philadelphia in 1787, as Professor
Julius Goebel has pointed out, the issue of a bill of rights "was only
fugitively an issue."'46 Goebel restates Alexander Hamilton's view:
The Constitution was designed merely to regulate the political
interests of the nation, and a minute detailing of particular rights
was not applicable as it would be in a constitution which regulated
every species of personal and private rights.47
Hamilton asked: "Why declare that things shall not be done which
there is no power [in Congress] to do?" 48  Indeed, he argued that a bill
of rights would be but a gratuitous imitation of that primitive phase of
man's progress when rights were "obtained by the barons, sword in
43. See H. ARENDT, ON REvOLutioN 204 (1965).
44. See J. GOEBEL, JR., 1 OLIvER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGs TO 1801, at
248-49 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GOEBEL].
45. The states were Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Id. at 101 & n.15.
46. Id. at 250.
47. Id. at 320.
48. C. BOWEN, MIRACLE kT PHILADELPHA 245 (1966) (brackets in original)
[hereinafter cited as BOWEN]. See also note 53 infra.
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hand, from King John."4 9 Others contended that to codify these liber-
ties and privileges was an ill-advised and impossible task. James Wil-
son said: "Enumerate all the rights of men? I am sure that no gentle-
man in the late Convention would have attempted such a thing." 50
Connecticut's Noah Webster lampooned those who would nonetheless
make the effort to compile a comprehensive list. He asked:
Why not declare that everybody shall, in good weather, hunt on
his own. . . land, and catch fish in rivers that are public property,
and that Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant . . . from
eating and drinking at seasonable times, or prevent his lying on his
left side, in a long winter's night, or even on his back, when he
is fatigued by lying on his right.51
Raising a more poignant objection, John Dickinson urged simply
that fundamental rights "must be preserved by soundness of sense and
honesty of heart," not constitutional articulation. 52  Even Madison was
originally opposed to a bill of rights, thinking it "unnecessary and
dangerous."55 In the convention itself, the final vote was ten states to
none against the proposal.54
In the end, of course, a bill of rights was adopted, and few today
would question the wisdom and prudence of enacting the first ten
amendments. Even the strongest supporters of the idea recognized,
however, that it could be neither a sufficient nor even the principal
means of achieving a eunomic polity, a republic where the values
expressed in the Bill of Rights would thrive. For example, no one is
more properly associated with the movement for a bill of rights than
Thomas Jefferson.55 Yet it was Jefferson who exhorted his fellow
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 536 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton) [hereinaf-
ter cited as THE FEDERALIST].
50. BOWEN, supra note 48, at 245-46.
51. Id. at 246.
52. Id.
53. GOEBEL, supra note 44, at 425. As Professor Goebel points out elsewhere in
his work, there was a fear that having a bill of rights would supply handles "for a
doctrine of constructive powers." Id. at 320. Madison elaborated on this theme in a
letter to Thomas Jefferson. While expressing approval of the concept of a bill of rights,
he notes that it must "be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in
the enumeration . . . ." He goes on to say that "there is great reason to fear that a
positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the
requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to
public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an
assumed power." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in
PADOvER, supra note 17, at 253.
54. BowEN, supra note 48, at 244.
55. Jefferson's disappointment with the convention's failure to include a bill of
rights in the Constitution and his subsequent successful fight to remedy that omission
[Vol. 3
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citizens that "the most effectual means" of preventing tyranny involved
illuminating "the minds of the people at large,"5 Jefferson who argued
"that laws will be wisely formed, and honestly administered, in propor-
tion as those who form and administer them are wise and honest,"'5" and
Jefferson who counseled that "laws provide against injury from others;
but not from ourselves. God himself will not save men against their
wills."' 8 The author of the Declaration of Independence and his fellow
framers would have no quarrel with Justice Frankfurter's observation
200 years later: "Civil liberties draw at best only limited strength from
legal guaranties."59
The Federalist, the authoritative exegesis of the Constitution,"0 is
emphatic that the nation's survival as a "secular moral order"61 depends
primarily on its citizens, rather than on its founding document. The
author of The Federalist No. 51 asserted without reservation: "A de-
pendence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the govern-
ment."' 62  The famous protections articulated in The Federalist Nos.
1013 and 514 are characterized as "auxiliary" to this primary safeguard,
the moral vigilance of the citizenry. 5 As Madison, the principal author
are, of course, well known. As he wrote in a famous letter to Madison: "A bill of rights
is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or
particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inferences." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, in A. KocH, JEFFERSON AND
MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 41 (1964).
56. T. JEFFERSON, Preamble to a Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowl-
edge, in PADOVER, supra note 17, at 1048.
57. Id.
58. Jefferson, Notes on Religion, in PADOvER, supra note 17, at 943.
59. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
60. The Federalist is justly famous and justly relied upon by constitutional scholars
and American historians alike. In the words of Clinton Rossiter, "This work has always
commanded widespread respect as the first and still most authoritative commentary on
the Constitution of the United States." Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS, at vii (Mentor ed. 1961).
61. The phrase is from A. Kocm, MADISON'S "ADvicE TO My CoUtNrY" 46 (1966)
(emphasis omitted) [hereinafter cited as MADISON'S "ADVICE"]. See also Rostow, supra
note 7, at 210.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 49, at 23 (J. Madison).
63. The principal protections outlined in The Federalist No. 10 involve the
advantages of a republic, specifically the theory of representation and, in the case of the
United States, large size, making oppression by a minority less likely. TrE FEDERALIST
No. 10, supra note 49, at 51-60 (J. Madison).
64. The principal protections articulated in The Federalist No. 51 involve, of course,
the advantages of division of power, breaking up official authority, and checks and
balances. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 49, at 322-27 (J. Madison).
65. Id. at 323.
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and defender of the Constitution,6" noted in the Virginia Convention:
"To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or
happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea."67 The
Federalist's defense of the Constitution against specific objections also
reflects this consistent dependence on citizen virtue. In reponding to
fears of an oppressive majoritarian faction, The Federalist assumes that
principles of "justice and the general good," which no written document
could ensure, must form the protection against this danger.68  More
directly, when asked what would prevent the legislative branch from
discriminating in its own favor, the author of The Federalist No. 57
looks primarily to the republican virtue of the people:
I answer: the genius of the whole system; the nature of just and
constitutional laws; and, above all, the vigilant and manly spirit
which actuates the people of America-a spirit which nourishes
freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law
not obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the
people will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.6 9
On a more general level, the same author argues that ultimate and
proper responsibility for achieving the "aim of every political constitu-
tion"-to obtain wise and virtuous rulers who will pursue the common
good and to keep them virtuous while they hold the public trust-rests
with the citizenry. 70
The authors of The Federalist, in short, were explicit in asserting
that the business of forging and maintaining republican government,
while it depends in part on a good constitution and proper institutions, is
primarily the work of virtue. These framers anticipated no institutional
solutions to the problems of men living together; 71 rules and arrange-
66. There is no more eloquent tribute to Madison, the father of the Constitution,
than that paid by John Quincy Adams after Madison's death: "Is it not in a pre-eminent
degree by emanations from his mind, that we are assembled here as the representatives of
people and the states of this Union? Is it not transcendentally by his exertions that we
address each other here by the endearing appellations of country-men and fellow-
citizens?" Speech by John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives, June 30, 1836,
in MADISON'S "ADvicE," supra note 61, at 158.
67. Speech in the Virginia Convention, June 20, '1788, in PxDovER, supra note 17,
at 339.
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 49, at 27 (J. Madison).
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 49, at 358 (J. Madison).
70. Id. at 356.
71. The convention rejected, for example, one proposal that would have made the
chief justice a kind of "custos morum," with responsibility to propose amendments to the
laws to "inculcate sound morality throughout the Union." GOEBEL, supra note 44, at
237.
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ments, including those of the Constitution whose adoption they were
urging, would not themselves be sufficient. To be sure, The Federalist
viewed the Constitution's choice of rules and arrangements as important,
and was vigorous in defending it. But as Federalist No. 55 attests, its
authors were no less emphatic about the fundamental presupposition on
which the success of the Constitution would depend:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a cer-
tain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem
and confidence. Republican government presupposes the exist-
ence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy
of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the
inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men
for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of des-
potism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one an-
other.72
The Constitution as a legal document may be, as Catherine Drink-
er Bowen has suggested, a "code for reference," 73 what in medieval days
had been called "jus civile. '74 But neither was it in 1787 nor is it today
the place where one looks to discover how the rights of men are faring;
nor does it tell how these rights can be achieved. Statement is not crea-
tion; incantation is not nurture. The legal order cannot by its mere ex-
istence in code, law, and document nourish the values upon which it
rests and depends.
Ill. Constitution and Conscience:
Hurst and Thoreau
Professor J. Willard Hurst has pointed out that it is incorrect to
view the constitutional order as a mere code of expediency that em-
bodies no moral values.7 5 Taking as his point of departure the popular
fascination with the notion that morality is exclusively the domain of
individual conscience, which was exemplified by Henry David Thoreau
and his many present-day heirs, Hurst emphasizes that the Constitu-
tion's broad principles of social ordering have a moral character them-
selves. 71 In Thoreau's view, matters of expediency belong to the law,
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, supra note 49, at 350.
73. BOWEN, supra note 481 at 246.
74. Id. "Jus civile" is "the body of Roman law relating to private rights, the
Civil Law." HARPER'S LATIN DICTioNA1RY 346 (C. Lewis & C. Short eds. 1907).
75. Hurst, supra note 14, at 31.
76. Id.
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while morality is found in the conscience of the individual. 77 His
exaltation of conscience is well known. "[A]ny man more right than
his neighbors," he informs us, "constitutes a majority of one . .7.8.
The moral bankruptcy of the social order is assumed: "Government,"
he claims, "is at best but an expedient,' '7 9 and Thoreau is even "desirous
• . . of being a bad subject."80  In believing that law is limited to
matters of nonmoral relations, Thoreau goes far beyond the idea that
law cannot create values, to the position that the legal and moral
domains are mutually exclusive.
Hurst convincingly refutes the theory of the moral insignificance of
the legal order explicit in Thoreau's categorical, simplistic dichotomy.
"[Tihe main current of our political tradition," he notes, "was to try to
use law to hold socially responsible the bursting energies of associated
effort."8' The Constitution's role in the maintenance of a moral order is
to provide access to and for those who do not otherwise possess inde-
pendent power; conversely, it precludes overweening influence for those
who do possess such power.8 2 When the legal order accomplishes this
and does so in a self-executing manner, it should be given its moral due;
and as Professor Hurst points out, the legal processes of the United
States have been sufficiently successful in the task of creating a certain
equality to justify viewing America's constitutional order as a normative
pillar of its moral order.8 3 Specific examples abound of law working in
aid of constructive general interests, against the specious rationality of
narrow, self-interested calculations. Under this heading Hurst places
such developments as -the Homestead Acts, 4 the Sherman Antitrust
Act,8 5 the Federal Reserve Acts, 6 and the Social Security Acts." Simi-
larly, law and Constitution have served as an effective check on the
immorality of official arrogance from the time of the Alien and Sedition
77. See H. THoREAU, Essay on Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN AND OTHER
WRmNs BY HENRY DAVm TOmEAru 635-59 (B. Atkinson ed. 1950).
78. Id. at 645.
79. Id. at 635.
80. Id. at 654.
81. Hurst, supra note 14, at 7.
82. Id. at 19-26, 37.
83. Id. at 8-9, 37.
84. E.g., Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1097 (codified in scattered
sections of 43 U.S.C.).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
86. E.g., Act of June 21, 1917, ch. 32, 40 Stat. 232 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.); Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
87. E.g., Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S C.). Hurst, supra note 14, at 8-10, 13 & n. 31.
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Acts"8 .to the era of Watergate. 9 Hurst emphasizes, in short, that this
constitutional legal order acts toward the achievement of a moral order
by ensuring "that all organized public or private power should exist
within procedures external to the powerholders by which others might
have reasonable fighting opportunity to demand an accounting as to the
ends and means of power." 0  Put more simply, the rule of law has
served as a necessary context for the growth of moral order in the
United States. Moreover, within this context judicial and legislative
action can fulfill a morally educative function; to borrow a phrase from
Justice Frankfurter, courts can "release contagious consequences." 91
Thus, Hurst concludes that Thoreau's denigration of social process to
mere expediency is "doctrinaire" in ignoring "the amount of humane
rationality embodied in this constitutional legal order. 92
Hurst is correct; my position, for all its emphasis on the moral lives
of citizens as a fundamental condition of a healthy society, cannot accept
Thoreau's denuded Constitution. My point is simply that the humane
rationality such an order possesses is neither sui generis nor self-execut-
ing. The law is certainly, as Holmes put it, "the witness and external
deposit of our moral life."93  The constitutional order embodies values
it does not generate; but the problems of generation and the problems of
nurture remain.
88. E.g., Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 73, 1
Stat. 596. See Hurst, supra note 14, at 9.
89. In this connection, Archibald Cox's assessment even before the resignation of
President Nixon is instructive. Referring to the events following the so-called "Saturday
Night Massacre" of late October, 1973, such as the appointment of an independent
prosecutor and the promise of production of tapes and documents, Cox writes:
"This sequence of events demonstrates better than any other occurrence within
memory the extent of this country's dedication to the principle that ours is a government
of laws and not of men. It gave proof of the people's determination and ability to
compel their highest officials to meet their obligations under the law as fully and
faithfully as others." Cox, Reflections on a Firestorm, SATURDAY REVIEw WORLD, Mar.
9, 1974, at 12.
Professor Freund commented in much the same vein after President Nixon's
resignation: "The constitutional crisis has been weathered. The institutions and proce-
dures established by the Constitution have worked, and worked magnificently." Freund,.
The Greatest Office: Citizen, Boston Globe, Aug. 10, 1974, at 1, col. 8 [hereinafter
cited as The Greatest Office].
90. Hurst, supra note 14, at 37.
91. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 217,
238 (1955).
92. Hurst, supra note 14, at 31.
93. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L, REv. 457, 459 (1897).
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IV. The Myth of Rights or Moral Order
In our times these moral problems are largely ignored. Perhaps
nothing is more indicative of this disregard than the current fascination
with and belief in the supposed political efficacy and ethical sufficiency
of law, which may be characterized as "the myth of rights." 4
Broadly speaking, this irresponsible dependency on law attempts to
reduce problems that are moral in character to mere insufficiencies of
law that can be solved by legislative draftsmanship or judicial interpreta-
tion.95 Legislation and litigation are thus pressed to take the place of
moral attentiveness. Awareness of the Constitution, particularly the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, grows; but the focus is
legalistic, centering on court and legislature as the primary and even
exclusive means of fostering decency and civility.96 Thus, rather than
encouraging popular reflection on the requirements of responsible citi-
zenship in a constitutional order, the myth of rights instead speeds the
march to court to set the world aright.97  "Good laws" and "good
decisions" are at the heart of this overly legalistic conception of the
eunomic republic, as if these things could, by themselves, yield good
men and a good society. Under the myth of rights, law serves as moral
principle and religious precept, and it is called upon to replace parent,
teacher, and rabbi as moral mentor. The Constitution is the Bible of
this developing secular dogma, the Bill of Rights its Decalogue; "due
process" stands as the principle doctrinal vehicle for reinterpretation of
94. S. SCHEINGoLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SCHEINGOLD]. Although I am indebted to Professor Scheingold for the phrase "myth of
rights" and for some of the textual elaboration of that idea which follows, I am unable to
agree with many of his conclusions. Scheingold's thesis is that "rights are most sensibly
thought of as agents of political mobilization rather than as ends in themselves." Id.
at 148. Thus, Scheingold proposes that we should rely on the political process rather
than the courts for the formulation and preservation of fundamental values. In the end,
then, I would argue that Scheingold substitutes an equally insufficient "myth of politics"
for the "myth of rights" whose shortcomings he demonstrates so well.
95. See id. at 17. The myth of rights "encourages us to break down social
problems into the responsibilities and entitlements established under law .... "Id.
96. See id. at 39-40. See generally id. at 39-61.
97. The march can be personified by Giles Corey, a character in Arthur Miller's
The Crucible, who was extremely proud of the fact that he litigated all his rights, as the
following bit of dialogue reveals:
"DANFoRTH: . . . You have no legal training, Mr. Corey?
"GILES, very pleased: I have the best, sir-I am thirty-three times in court in my
life. And always plaintiff, too.
"DANFoRTH: Oh, then you're much.put-upon.
"GmEs: I am never put-upon; I know my rights, sir, and I will have them." A.
MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 95 (1964).
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the orders of faith; Supreme Court decisions become formal ex cathedra
pronouncements on matters of faith and morals, and constitutional
amendments serve as the catechetical revisions required by a continuing
reformation.98
In all of this, believers in the myth of rights worship a false god.
The reason is not that our laws are deficient, or that our Constitution
has failed; rather, law and the Constitution cannot supply the resolution
of issues that believers expect. Certainly, as Professor Freund has
pointed out, law does provide invitations to citizens to act in ways that
affirm and bolster the values of a healthy society.99 Law can instruct us
about moral responsibility and afford us opportunities to become instru-
ments of our own best will. But law cannot itself create the values in
which that instruction and those opportunities are rooted. Civility can-
not be litigated into being; nor are decency and responsibility the prod-
ucts of legislation. The myth of rights intends to be moral but ignores
the need for moral foundation.
The dangers of the myth are evident. Its tendency to make society
more litigious, its emphasis on a compulsory morality rather than a
voluntary one, encourages a morality of threats, which is in fact no
morality at all.' °0 Recourse to law and courts occurs most often be-
cause private settlement and ordering have failed.' When this failure
is admitted wholesale, which is the end result when the myth of rights
predominates, the stage is set for widespread social pathology, a condi-
tion of collective moral asthenia. The moral high ground is abandoned
in favor of the moral low ground, the ground where prudence before the
sanctions of the law is primary, -the overriding motive for proper con-
duct.10 2  Ironically, the myth of rights also undermines the
law's legitimate role in th6 moral sphere. Knowledge of law and legal
experience do not make men good, as evidence in every generation of
men and lawyers attests. 10 3 Such is not the task of the law. According.:
98. The choice of religious metaphor is not accidental. As Professor Corwin has
noted, Americans have long had an aptitude for "documentary exegesis," which may
have had its origin in "theological disquisition." Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional
Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia
Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 521 (1925).
99. FREUND, supra note 2, at 89.
100. See generally THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNEsIAN WAR, ch. V, §§ 84-117 (Liv-
ingston ed. 1959); The Republic, PLATO, supra note 19, 576-630.
101. See H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PnocESS: BAsic PRoBLEMs IN THE
MAKnG A APPLICATION OF LAW 2-4 (1958).
102. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPIIYsIcs OF MoRALS 100-03 (H. Paton
trans. 1964) (distinction between morality and prudence).
103. One of the classic illustrations of this truth is found in Dickens' famed
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ly, in its insistence that courts and legislatures should and must make
men good, the myth of rights sows among the citizenry the seeds of
inevitable disillusionment. The relationship between good men and
good laws-a collaboration prerequisite to a healthy society' 04 -is ne-
cessarily obscured.
What finally lies beneath the myth of rights is the mistaken belief
that considerations of law and policy are somehow clearer and more
tangible than considerations of moral factors. Thus, the myth professes
to have firm footing in a hard-headed, concrete set of concerns, while
eschewing the supposedly abstract and ineffable realm of traditional
moral discourse.' 05 But as Professor A. I. Melden has shown, such
seemingly hard-headed, utilitarian considerations rest and depend upon
an understood and assumed moral network of persons, to and for whom
certain things have value.10 Thus, a view of what is just, of what is
appropriate for men, always precedes and underlies notions of utility. 07
In the kind of constitutional government we have created, we must face
the conclusion, and its implications, that the ethics of persons is central.
If Justice Frankfurter was correct in holding that the "'ultimate reli-
ance for the deepest needs of civilization must be found outside their
vindication in courts of law,"'1 8 I would submit that such ultimate
reliance rests on the citizenry in its daily activity. In the words of
Lincoln: "As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die
by suicide."'' 00 This moral dependence of the people to which so much
reference has been made, and upon which so much rests, is not a
dependence on something vague and ethereal. It is not reliance on the
vagaries of opinion and feeling, on half-conceived and barely articulable
notions of moral right and wrong." 0 It is dependence neither on social
description of the Court of Chancery in chapter one of Bleak House. Interestingly, even
as the myth of rights preaches that the solution to our moral ills lies in litigation and
legislation, the legal profession is self-consciously seeking to promote greater awareness
of ethics in both students and practitioners. See Fellers, State of the Legal Profession:
Annual Report of the President of the American Bar Association, 61 A.B.A.J. 1053,
1056-58 (1975).
104. See Crito, PLATO, supra note 19, at 27.
105. See SCHmNGOLD, supra note 94, at 46-47.
106. Melden, Utility and Moral Reasoning, in ETHIcs AND SoCIETY 173, 175, 195-96
(R.,T. DeGeorge ed. 1966).
107. Id.
108. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
109. Address of Abraham Lincoln before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield,
Illinois, Jan. 27, 1838, in Tm LiFE AND WarrINas oF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 231, 232 (P.
Van D. Stem ed. 1940).
110. Since the eunomic society is distinguished both by the presence of certain
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code or law on the one hand, nor on mere conscience or moral idiosyn-
cracy on the other. It is instead a reliance on lived principles of the type
outlined earlier in this article,"1' on what Madison, Jefferson, and
Hamilton called virtue."' When the framers spoke of virtue, they
believed neither that character could be forged by law, nor that a
citizenry worthy of its name would adopt a cavalier ethic."13
Professor Alasdair MacIntyre has commented that one of the awful
conditions of life for modem man is that he tends not to have goals
values and by a concern to foster, nurture, and defend them, public recognition of and
belief in objective values must undercut any notion of moral subjectivity or relativism as
a precondition to survival of a moral order.
It is important to realize as well that we do not need a philosophy of moral
relativism to preserve those aspects of our public life which that philosophy purports to
protect. We do not need to be relativists in order to advocate and respect the values of
tolerance and individual difference. Nor must we be relativists to know and remember
that reasonable people of good will can disagree. The best of our deliberations do not
lead us to final answers. But the fact that our answers are subject to further considera-
tion is cause for neither despair, intolerance, nor abandonment of the inquiry with the
shrugged shoulders of the relativist. If, adopting the posture of moral relativism, we
come to believe that responsibility and argument about values is appropriate only in a
court and only with respect to laws, but not in day-to-day affairs and problems where,
supposedly, "opinion must reign," we may face the abandonment of dialogue about values
and the augment of a moral vacuum. This in turn may vitiate a central and necessary
predicate for the effective operation of our republican form of government. The
existence of a eunomic moral order presupposes that the citizenry possesses a "hard-
headed," judgmentally defensible sense of what is appropriate, of what is right. This
does not refer to any lilting quixoticism about "good and evil" or "being a good citizen."
Rather, it involves a commitment to judgment, a willingness to take and assign responsi-
bility on the basis of that judgment, and a belief that individuals (including oneself)
must be held accountable in public matters by publicly acceptable standards of the type
described earlier in this essay. See text accompanying notes 10-20 supra. If we are to
be citizens as Aristotle defined that term-those who govern and obey as free men (see
ARISTOTLE, supra note 11, at 101-06)-we must be able to look for and to recognize the
moral quality of our actions; the moral vacuum of relativism will not suffice.
111. See text accompanying notes 10-20 supra.
112. See, e.g., T. JEFFERSON, Preamble to a Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge, in PADOvER, supra note 17, at 42.
113. The following quote from Pennsylvania's James Wilson illustrates precisely
how far the founders were from contemplating such an ethic: "A good con-
stitution is the greatest blessing, which a society can enjoy. Need I infer, that
it is the duty of every citizen to use his best and most unremitting endeavours
for preserving it pure, healthful, and vigorous? For the accomplishment of this great
purpose, the exertions of no one citizen are unimportant. Let no one, therefore,
harbour, for a moment, the mean idea, that he is and can be of no value to his country;
let the contrary manly impression animate his soul. Every one can, at many times,
perform, to the state, useful services; and he, who steadily pursues the road of patriotism,
has the most inviting prospect of being able, at some times, to perform eminent ones." 2
THm WoRKs OF JAmES WILSON 773, 778 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) (address by James
Wilson, July 4, 1788).
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beyond the scope of his personal appetites and desires." 4  Professor
MacIntyre thus has highlighted our impulses toward a self-destructive
hedonism. Although law cannot provide satisfactory alternative
grounds for self-realization, the values, the lived principles on which the
vitality of law depends, should prove more successful. What we need
now, more than anything else, is to renew those convictions from which
our public morality springs.
Between the myth of rights and Thoreau lies a large middle ground
of social interaction where civility must be forged, or it is forged
nowhere. That ground, I would submit, is presently not occupied. In
this bicentennial period, however, the future remains open and as
Walter Lippman said: "The acquired culture is not transmitted in our
genes and so the issue is always in doubt." 1 5 In the end, if we are to
achieve eunomia we are left with the task of being attentive to those
spirits of moderation and of other values that Judge Hand feared could
not be thrust upon the courts. I believe that such nurture will take
place as exemplary individuals and moral agents are living, working,
and admired in homes, schools, churches, and other institutions, or it
will not take place at all. Ultimately, the critical factor will continue to
be how we come to conceive of ourselves and our proper ends. 6 How
we deal with each other day to day will bode much for the future of our
constitutional moral order." 7
114. Address of Alasdair MacIntyre at the National Humanities Faculty Summer
Workshop in Durham, New Hampshire, July 23, 1974.
115. LIPPMAN, The Renewal of the Public Philosophy, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 75
(1955).
116. See id. at 135-38.
117. As Professor Freund put it in commenting on the Watergate affair: "What
is more problematic, and in the long run more basic, is whether a moral cri-
sis of America as a people has been recognized and surmounted. For the events of
Watergate reflect, in caricature to be sure, some of the strains in the national character.
"The quality of our government, of our public life, will reflect the attitudes,
the culture, of the nation at large. We have experienced an orderly, if painful, transition
in our highest public office. More important will be the question whether we will be
moved by the whole experience to a clearer appreciation of the values we profess, and a
more active insistence upon them in public and private relationships. For it remains true
that in a democracy the most important office is that of citizen." The Greatest Office,
supra note 89, at 8, col. S.
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